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Abstract 
Shadows are intriguing phenomena. They do not have mass or energy. So, they are 
unable to have some basic characteristics of the objects of which they are shadows: 
they cannot move by themselves and they cannot experience the same kind of changes. 
At first sight, any theory of perception can skip this optical phenomenon or look at it 
only as a side-effect. Actually, in order to be seen objects must be illuminated and one 
of the consequences of this is that they project a shadow over the surrounding space. Is 
that all? In this paper I will argue that, from a phenomenological point of view (or at 
least from a Husserlian oriented phenomenology), shadows, with their specific hyletic 
data, must be considered as an element of the process of constitution of spatial-temporal 
objectivities. In other words, shadows no less than other predicates, like extension or 
hardness, although in a different manner, belong to the a priori structure of those 
objectivities. This means that their ontological status is quite different from that of 
fictitious objects or hallucinations. To show this I will draw mainly in Husserl’s Lesson 
Thing and Space, from 1907, and other unpublished texts during Husserl’s lifetime, 
like the second volume of the Ideas and the Lesson of 1925 on Psychological 
Phenomenology. 
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Up to now, shadows have not attracted much attention on the part of 
phenomenologists. Phenomenology deals much more easily with perceptions, 
illusions, remembrances, or fantasies. Phenomenologists that are used to deal 
with psychiatric diseases sometimes address hallucinations and other 
pathological behaviors of the same kind, where shadows are occasionally taken 
for real persons or animals. But the phenomenon of shadow has so far occupied 
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the backstage of analysis. It is a little strange that things have happened that 
way. One of the accepted translations of the German word Abschattung is 
adumbration. The Latin word umbra, from which adumbration comes, means 
precisely “shadow”. Of course, neither from the noetic nor from the noematic 
side may an Abschtattung be compared to a shadow1, even if we must reckon 
that a shadow is, simultaneously, something dependent on the thing intended 
and its external horizon, of the intending subject, and on how they both stand 
regarding the source of light. But here some difficulties arise. 
1. Strictly speaking, a shadow is not something that belongs to an object. 
It is either the form of the object projected over the surrounding space 
(or sometimes over a screen) due to the place from which light comes 
from, or the form of a second object projected over the first, when the 
second object interposes between the first and the light-source. 
2. The intending subject may project his own shadow over the intended 
object and in this circumstance be the cause of the adumbration of the 
noema. 
These two difficulties – regarding what I dare to call the indeterminacy of 
the ontological status of shadows – seem to mean that problems regarding 
shadows have after all an easy solution. A shadow is so to speak a side-effect 
of the horizontal character of our worldly experience. Nevertheless, horizontal 
intentionality functions differently here from other perceptual experiences. In 
ordinary experiences, horizontal intentionality entails the fact that in every 
perceptual act I experience the absent profiles or adumbrations of the thing 
intended, although I can only see the present profile. In the case of shadows 
two different things happens: we “abstract” from the shadow (i.e. we don’t 
explicitly take notice of it) when we try to figure out the material characteristics 
of the perceived object – like shape or color – and simultaneously acknowledge 
its existence as inherent to the perception of a physical object under certain light 
conditions. 
 
1 Husserl in § 28 of Phenomenological Psychology (1968: 160) says that adumbrations 
are not silhouettes, i.e. profiles (Schattenrisse) in the usual meaning of the word. 
Silhouettes are spatial objects, subjected to the same adumbration process as other 
special objects. Of course, what I claim in this paper is that shadows are neither 
adumbrations – although, like adumbrations, they depend on the point of view of the 
perceiver – nor silhouettes. 
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Nevertheless, even if we must acknowledge that without an horizon there 
would not be shadows at all, moreover, that without the necessary location of 
every intending subject in a spatial “here” (and the corresponding location of 
the intended object in a spatial “there”), there would be no shadows, the 
problem is much more complicated as I intend to show in this paper. For the 
moment, three things at least can be said about shadows. In the first place, that 
they are perceived; and perception is the presentation of something “in person”, 
not a representation, like remembrance or fantasy; secondly, that shadows are 
different from adumbrations, although they can be part of the reason why a 
certain thing adumbrates itself when perceived from a certain perspective; in 
the third place, that shadows are indubitably phenomena, i.e. they are 
something that appears to consciousness, but hardly can be called objects, at 
least in the sense that we call “object” any space-temporal thing2.  
Adumbrations are not a hindrance to knowledge, at least as long as certain 
variation limits are not surpassed (Husserl, 1973: 128). This may happen when 
I look at an object from a distance too long to allow me to figure out its shape 
or color. Of course, it all depends on what my interests are directed to; a 
synthesis of a set of appearances may be enough to grasp the characteristics I 
am interested in, but not enough to grasp a different characteristic distinct from 
the former. It can also happen that some differences between appearances that 
first remained unnoticed become later of special importance to the fulfillment 
of an intention, due to a change in the interest. In some cases, adumbrations 
caused by shadows may be useful. When our interest is directed to such 
characteristics of the thing intended like the material of which it is made, or the 
properties of its surfaces (for instance, if they are more or less rough or 
scratchy), the contrast between light and shadow may be of some help.   
But that’s not all; shadows can have other amazing characteristics. 
Experiments have shown that when the shadow of a sphere is projected against 
a screen, the shadow is not seen turning around itself when the sphere does 
 
2 Of course, in a wider sense of the word “object”, that is very common in Husserl’s 
writings, meaning anything that can be thought of without contradiction, – such as a 
mathematical concept or a moral value – shadows could also be called objects. As I 
will stress later, the fact that shadows have a relational character, since they have no 
independent existence from the relation between an object and a light source, means 
that they cannot be called strictly speaking “properties” of an object. 
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(Sorenson, 2006: 346). Now, if the sphere and its shadow may have opposite 
properties, why not ask the following question: what happens to the shadow 
when the sphere is not rotating? Or to put it more clearly: since the shadow of 
a rotating sphere is indiscernible from the shadow of an immobile sphere, what 
conclusions should we draw regarding the relation between the properties of a 
thing and its shadow?  
Other difficulties arise. Husserl once talked about the difficulty in 
synthesizing all the hyletic data of an object (Husserl, 1968: 154). We could 
expect some congruence between optical sensations and tactile sensations, for 
instance, but as we know there is none. The tactile experience of a sphere is 
different from the tactile experience of a cube, but they can have the same color. 
From a tactile experience, I can deduce some aspects of the visual experience 
of that same thing, namely, how it will look like, i.e. its form, but not all the 
visual aspects. With shadows things are even more awkward: two different 
colored spheres can project the same grayish shadow.   
Our previous example of the shadow of a rotating sphere could legitimate 
the definition of shadows as dematerialized forms. Dematerialized spheres 
cannot move, since movement is a characteristic of material bodies, or one of 
its modes, to take traditional philosophical vocabulary. However, most of the 
times, the shadows move with their objects; anyone that is making a journey by 
car or by train can easily see the shadow of the car or the train over the 
surrounding landscape, when light conditions allow it. Later we will also see 
that, in certain situations, shadows – or more exactly, the contrast between light 
and shadow – can show some specific material qualities of the objects. 
Another interesting aspect is the fact that not all material objects that 
interpose between a first object and the light source can project a shadow. 
Molecules of oxygen or hydrogen, or small grains of dust (at least up to a certain 
quantity), present in the air that light passes through, don’t project any kind of 
shadow. Aristotle called the air diaphanes, diaphanous milieu. Ignoring 
molecules and without taking dust into account, he nevertheless highlighted a 
fundamental property of light, namely, the fact that it spreads uniformly 
through the surrounding space. 
Furthermore, shadows play an important role in the perception of objects 
endowed with aesthetic value. That is the case of three-dimensional objects, 
like statues and architecture. To a certain extent, they belong to the same world 
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where we find objects of everyday use or technical devices; they share with 
them some material and spatial characteristics, and they reflect light and project 
their shadows just the same way. Architects in particular took advantages of the 
knowledge of the properties of light to evince the aesthetic qualities of 
buildings. But shadows also play a special role in drawing and painting. Here 
they almost always have the role of simulating three-dimensional objects in a 
two-dimensional surface. However, their aim is not to replace normal 
perception or to function as a kind of substitute of it. As Merleau-Ponty once 
said (1948: 25), paintings don’t imitate the real world, but paint it as if it were 
beginning to exist. Shadows are a part of this process. 
I think we have already gathered several reasons to make shadows deserve 
being analyzed. 
 
1. Multiple uses of the word “shadow” 
 
The word “Shadow” has multiple uses, some of them proper, others 
metaphorical. We speak of a “shadow of a doubt” or of the “shadow of a smile”, 
most of the times in a negative sentence. We mean that, in certain 
circumstances, such things as doubts or smiles don’t really exist, or can hardly 
be noticed. When a statement convinces me of its truth, when I have no reasons 
to doubt that it is true, I can say that I don’t even have the shadow of a doubt. 
Something very similar happens when we speak of the shadow of a smile; this 
means that we guess that someone wanted to smile but didn’t do it, or perhaps 
just smiled a little out of fear to show his own feelings. Anyway, the concept 
of shadow seems to point out to a certain absence3. That is exactly what 
happens, at least according to the mainstream interpretations, in the more 
 
3 Husserl uses the expression “realm of shadows” when he speaks of fantasy images 
and distinguishes these last images from images in the proper meaning of the term due 
to the fact that the former need not be compared to the actual world, as the latter do. 
Here too we can find a relation between shadows and a certain kind of absence: in 
phantasy image reality is absent, phantasy is not mixed with it but forms a realm of its 
own. In the case of images there are two perceptual apprehensions, eventually 
conflicting with each other in those cases in which we say that the image does not fit to 
the reality. In contrast to perceptual reality, phantasy is composed of shadow images 
(Husserl, 1980: 181). 
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proper use of the concept (namely, in the optical realm), when the shadow is 
defined as an absence of light4. One of the things I intend to show in this paper 
is that it is possible to offer, in a theory of perception, a “positive” definition of 
it5. Of course, phenomenology doesn’t have any kind of optical theory to offer, 
but it can offer a philosophical explanation of the way we experience optical 
phenomena.  
The relation between those phenomena like smiling or doubting and 
what happens with optical phenomena is clear in most of the cases. But their 
exact connection with what goes on in normal perceptions is not so clear. 
Because when an object projects the shadow of its form over the surface of 
another object, there is something to see; shadows in this situation can be seen 
– even if most of the times they are not taken into account –, otherwise they 
would be nothing at all. In this situation, what in one of the objects can be 
considered a negative phenomenon – it is less illuminated than it would 
otherwise be if there was not a second object that projects its shadow over it – 
must, regarding this second object, be considered a positive property. In other 
situations, when, in normal perceptual conditions, someone says that he sees no 
shadows he may only mean that, as long as the thing is seen from the place he 
occupies in space, the thing projects no shadow over its surrounding. As we 
know, in order to see shadows, we must not look in the direction of the light 
source. Shadows are never that part of an object that I cannot see for the 
moment, like for instance the back of a house hidden by its front, or the inside 
of an orange that has not yet been peeled6. 
 
4 Actually, due to the properties of the light waves, light is not entirely absent in 
shadowed areas. Behind a tree that hides us the sun, for instance, we can still see the 
surrounding space, because the sun rays contour the extremities of the tree. 
5 In some metaphorical uses of “shadow” we can also find a positive meaning of the 
metaphor. Like the projection of a shadow over the surrounding space can have a 
protective effect, as e.g. the shadow of a tree in a hot summer day, similarly “to be 
under the shadow” of someone or something often has a positive meaning. 
6 Husserl labels Auffassungskomponente (i.e. components of the interpretation of the 
meaning of the thing perceived) those elements in a thing that point to the not yet or no 
more perceived parts of it (Husserl, 1973: 56). I don’t think that this concept is very 
helpful to understand what happens in the case of shadows. I will try to show why 
above. 
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It seems then that if we take into account the ideal circumstances7 in 
which a thing should be given to perception – i.e., when it could be given just 
like it is, the intention directed to it founding its appropriate fulfillment –, 
shadows don’t belong to  things. Nevertheless, they play a specific role in 
perception. Looking to Figure 1, 
we conclude that shadows 
highlight the three-dimensionality 
of objects. Of course, since we are 
looking  to a drawing, shadows 
and the distinction between 
different shadow zones – i.e. the 
different ways light is spread8 
across the drawn human face – are 
the only process the designer has 
at his disposal to simulate the 
three-dimensionality. But I claim 
that the same holds in the case of perception of real three-dimensional persons 
or objects: the abovementioned differences concur to the process of constitution 
of a three-dimensional object9. We can only suppose that light spreads with the 
 
7 By “ideal circumstances” I mean what Husserl calls (1973, 127) maximale 
Gagebenheit. I will come to this issue above. 
8 The fact that light (or brightness) as well as shadow spread along the surface of an 
object makes them different not only from other properties like weight or smoothness 
but also from color, which also spreads along a surface. Regarding color, the important 
difference lies in the fact that the lightened or shadowed parts of a surface are entirely 
dependent on the movement or stillness of the light source and of the perceiving subject. 
That’s why light and shadow may be called anhängende Eigenshaften (appended 
properties). A paper from Filip Mattens (2008: 118) called my attention to this 
important Husserlian concept (Husserl, 1973: 67). I will come back to this issue in my 
Final Remarks. 
9 I still have a further claim, but it goes beyond the limits of this paper. I claim that 
essences (eide) don’t correspond to a vision from nowhere; on the contrary, Husserl’s 
notion of essence (eidos) includes a necessary reference to all real and possible 
perspectives of any intended object. That’s why, in Ideas I, Husserl made a sharp 
distinction between geometrical and phenomenological essences and denied the 
possibility of a kind of geometry of lived experience. The objectivities that the 
phenomenologist tries to grasp are given in concrete and observable acts and based on 
Figure 1 
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same brightness across the surface of a statue, for instance, when we imagine 
ourselves seeing it from nowhere.  
That’s why, to use an expression coined by Robert Sokolowski, we can 
say that shadows belong to the “noematic pattern” (Sokolowski, 1964: 155) of 
spatial-temporal objects. We would doubt of the existence of an object 
belonging to this “region” if someone had told us that he or she has seen one 
that, under a light source, didn’t project a shadow over its surrounding space. 
For much the same reason, we doubt of the existence of vampires like Count 
Dracula, if, according to tradition, they are a kind of beings that don’t have their 
own images projected by a mirror. As far as our present knowledge goes, it 
belongs to the “noematic pattern” of the type of things that have the property 
of occupying space the fact that their image can be projected by a mirror, as 
well as it belongs to the physical characteristics of a mirror the possibility of 
projecting the image of any kind of thing or object capable of standing in front 
of it. Likewise, a complete phenomenological analysis of a material thing, i.e. 
an analysis of the predicates that are proper to it, will show that it belongs to 
every material thing, besides such properties as extension or hardness – with its 
noetic counterparts in hyletic data like vision or tactile sensations –, the 
property of projecting a shadow10.  
Now, our problem is: has Sokolowski’s “noematic pattern” something 
to do with the above mentioned Auffassungskomponente? I claim they are 
closely connected as long as we mean ordinary thing-predicates or properties, 
but not when we mean shadows or, at least, not in the same fashion. Husserl 
says in the Lessons on Psycholgical Phenomenology that further intentional 
acts of the same object explicate the meaning intended in former ones (Husserl, 
1968: 184). Going back to my previous example of the perception of a house, 
 
human beings’ lifeworld real experiences, even if in the process of variation, the 
phenomenologist may seek the help from imagination. 
10 It seems to be a common property of light and shadow the fact that they are both 
projections. An opaque object like the Moon can project the Sun’s light that illuminates 
it. That’s the reason why we can perceive them, otherwise they would be invisible, even 
if some other senses, like touch, would give us notice that something “is there”. 
Nevertheless, projected light, just like the shadow, are clearly distinct from such 
properties as color or shape. The fact that light and shadow can affect the way we pick 
up those other properties is a quite different issue. 
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we could say that the perception of the back explicates the full meaning of the 
act that presented me its front, because while perceiving the front I was actually 
intending the whole house. That is why the back can be labelled an 
Auffassungskomponent. He was already there for me to see and I could have 
seen it first if my perspective, i.e. my previous “here”, were different. 
It is doubtful that shadows are there for me to see or measure in the 
same way that the ordinary thing-predicates, which Husserl calls 
raumerfüllende Eigenshaften (1973: 67), are. For someone in a certain “here”, 
shadows just don’t exist where another person, in another “here” (that for me 
is a “there”), can see them. Although the perceived qualities of an object always 
have a certain relation to our kinesthetic system, shadows have not the same 
kind of relation that other predicates have. In Ideas II, Husserl claimed: 
  
The qualities of material things as aestheta, such as they present to me 
intuitively, prove to be dependent on my qualities, the make-up of the 
experiencing subject, and to be related to my Body and my “normal 
sensibility”. (Husserl, 1952: 56) 
 
Differences are obvious, but by no means least important. I cannot cut 
across an extended body, but I can cut across the shadow of that body; I can 
make a tactile experience of an extended body, but I cannot touch a shadow (at 
most I can feel a lower air temperature when I put myself under the shadow of 
an extended body); and other similar differences that anyone can easily find for 
himself. 
In § 44 of Ideas I, Husserl, without mentioning shadows, makes an 
important remark about “abnormal” ways of giveness that have a certain 
connection with our issue. In brief, Husserl argues that if we took from the thing 
that is being presented (namely through perception) the multiplicity of its 
appearances other than the normal ones, the fact that we are entitled to speak of 
a giveness wouldn’t mean anything at all (Husserl, 1950: 102). For a white 
surface to appear like a gray surface some “abnormal” condition must be 
present: namely, it must be dimmed by a shadow. If we follow Husserl’s 
thought in Ideas I, we should conclude that it belongs to the way things are 
given such “abnormalities” as the fact that the space behind a thing may appear 
surrounded by a halo of its own shadow, or that on some of its sides or on its 
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front is project the shadow of another thing. Shadows, so it seems, no less than 
light, play some role in the process of constitution of spatial-temporal objects. 
As Merleau-Ponty once stressed, shadows, like other optical phenomena, are 
not things, but play nonetheless an important role, since they set the limits to 
their possible “fields of variation” (Merleau-Ponty, 1960: 202). 
However, in other places, Husserl seems to say something different 
from what he claimed in Ideas I. In Thing and Space, namely, he speaks about 
a “maximum of givenness” of a thing as an ideal that governs every intentional 
act and he elucidates what he means with the example of the perception of an 
hexaeder (Husserl, 1973: 127). Not only must the hexaeder be in front position 
regarding the intending subject but it must also be under good lightning 
conditions. A little further (1973: 132), while discussing the conditions of 
clarity11 in the perceptual giveness of an object, Husserl numbers a series of 
physical circumstances that can hinder that clarity and among them he mentions 
again the poor lightning conditions. Given the fact that the “ideal 
circumstances” I mentioned above are not subjected to variations in degree – 
only the “abnormal circumstances” can vary according to their greater or lesser 
vicinity with the ideal ones –, and given also the fact that shadows can be 
counted as an abnormality, we must give a closer look to one of my claims is 
this paper: namely, the fact that shadows can be considered as a factor that we 
cannot put aside in the process of constitution of space-temporal objects. 
In our lifeworld perceptual experience of things shadows play a role that is 
not very different from the role played by light and colors, i.e. normal 
perception in normal circumstances includes abnormalities, if by this last word 
we mean something that hinders a thing to appear like it is. That is the great 
lesson of the impressionist painters in the late XIXth century (Merleau-Ponty, 
1948: 20-21). If the green leaves of a tree could be painted with small patches 
of red, for instance, it was because the relation of each single leave with all the 
others, with the light of a bright summer day and with the human eye entailed 
the sensation of seeing a red color. Or, as Merleau-Ponty explained, to render 
 
11 Clarity is my translations of Deutlichkeit. Husserl dedicates the entire § 38 of Thing 
and Space (Husserl, 1973: 132-134) to a determination of the conditions of clarity in 
the giveness of a thing. There, Husserl also distinguishes Klarheit from Deutlichkeit. 
The distinction seems to be grounded on the fact that Klarheit has degrees; Deutlichkeit 
is only the highest degree of Klarheit. 
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the natural vibration of the grass seen at  the open air under the light of a room 
where a painting with green grass will hang on a wall, the painter must mix the 
green with patches of red. A similar experience could be said to happen when 
we perceive real objects in the real world, in cases of contrast between light and 
shadow, or between colors of objects seen under a light source and seen under 
the projection of the shadow of another object. 
  
 
2. Shadows do not adumbrate 
 
We must give shadows the same kind of transcendence we give to perceived 
objects. Just like we, perceiving the latter, put them into the world, amid other 
objects of the same ontological kind, we have to put shadows in the world 
where we perceive them. However, shadows have a different status from other 
physical objects, as well as a different status from other kinds of transcendent 
“objects”, like moral values or mathematical concepts. To sum up, from what 
has been said so far, we can say that, albeit their transcendence, the possibility 
of being perceived seems to depend on three different factors: 
1. The existence of physical objects, from which they are shadows, or 
whose own shadow they project over others. 
2. The existence (at least in some cases) of a horizon in which those 
objects make their appearance. 
3. The existence of an intending subject who sees the shadows or projects 
its own shadow over what he sees. 
Regarding what I said in 1, we must now add that the dependence of the 
shadow from existing physical objects or persons is of a totally different kind 
from the dependence of certain physical characteristics, which, like heat, for 
instance, Husserl labelled “dependent determinations” (Husserl, 1973: 78). 
When a body has been uniformly heated, it is possible to feel the same heat in 
any of its parts, touching them with our hands. Of course, one can feel the heat 
just by approaching the body without touching it, but regarding its causes this 
whole phenomenon is independent of the subject who feels the heat. With 
shadows, it’s just the opposite. Since shadows do not keep constant their 
geometrical form like the objects of which they are shadows, it’s enough to get 
closer to an object or to go around it to see its shadow changing shape and 
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dimensions12. In extreme cases a shadow can disappear altogether if someone 
changes the place from which he was until then looking at a certain object. All 
this means that shadows depend on a certain relation of the perceiving subject 
to the world and they change with changes in that relation in a way that is not 
exclusively dependent on the objects of which they are the shadows. 
There are still other interesting differences when we compare shadows with 
the so-called “dependent determinations”. I can heat a body at leisure, at least 
up to the point it begins to melt, but I cannot move the shadow of a body without 
first moving the body. In the same way, a body, once disconnected from the 
source of heat, starts spontaneously to loose temperature, at a speed that 
depends on its own material constitution (that speed is not the same for different 
kinds of metals, for instance); a shadow cannot move spontaneously, it doesn’t 
accumulate any form of energy as well as it is deprived of any. 
As is well known, Husserl explained in Ideas I that, owing to an essential 
law, every transcendent physical object adumbrates itself and that the kern of 
what is actually present is surrounded by something concomitantly given, even 
if in a vague and indeterminate way (Husserl, 1950: 100). We can easily reckon 
that, albeit the shadow’s physical nature, the distinction between a kern and the 
concomitantly given has no place here. Of course, someone could argue against 
this what we just said in the last paragraph: when we turn around a physical 
object, we can see modifications in the shape of the shadow, corresponding to 
our position regarding the source of light. But we are not experiencing new 
“profiles” of the same shadow as we experience new profiles of the same thing. 
“Normally” we don’t even look at the shadow, we are just experiencing new 
profiles of the thing perceived, eventually accompanied by the consciousness 
that each new profile of the same thing projects in the surrounding space a new 
shape of the thing’s own shadow13. 
 
12 A special field of geometry studies the way physical bodies project their shadows; 
it’s called projective geometry. One of the first mathematicians to dedicate himself to 
a thorough study of the geometrical laws of the projection of shadows was Johann 
Heinrich Lambert, a contemporary and correspondent of Kant. 
13 We say that a shadow is the same as long as it is the shadow of the same object. I 
think it is the most appropriate way of putting things. If we imagine a source of light 
(for instance, the Sun) turning around the same object, from rise to dawn, the shadow 
will change in form and size, but it will always be the same. Of course, this is a special 
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There is another remarkable difference between a thing seen from a certain 
perspective, with its respective profile, and the shadow a thing projects when 
seen from that same perspective. A profile points out to other profiles. Even if 
we look to a thing immobile and we also stand immobile – not moving our head 
or our eyes –, the limits of that profile are never a well-defined line. The limits 
always point out to what lies beyond themselves and entail an expectative 
regarding what will be seen next if we change our perspective. As Aron 
Gurwitsch once remarked (1957: 174), the succession of the perceptual 
noemata is a never-ending process. Nothing similar happens with shadows. 
Shadows are always two-dimensional, and their limits can be outlined. 
Sometimes there are zones of penumbra, but most of the times what lies beyond 
shadow is light. In normal perception, shadows can change their form, they can 
move with the movement of an object, they can even become more or less 
intense depending of the intensity of the light source; but, just as they don’t 
point out beyond themselves, they don’t offer new profiles to the perceiving 
subject. 
Perhaps Husserl’s well-known statement that the process of variation of the 
intending subject’s viewpoint may be carried out in imagination was also 
destined to answer similar difficulties. In fact, I can imagine myself turning 
around an object (or an object turning around its axe in front of me) 
disregarding all the surrounding objects and the place from which the light 
comes. Essential characteristics of the object, specifically its geometrical form, 
can then be grasped without the factual interference of others. Following the 
phenomenological reduction14, we may previously “suspend” those 
interferences. The identity of the object is only dependent of a single factor: 
 
case since we can perceive the continuity of the changes. However, in cases where this 
continuity cannot be perceived, would the identity of the object, regardless the identity 
of the light source, be sufficient to warrant the identity of the shadow? I think this 
question has no meaning. The reason has to do with the ontological status of the 
shadow; it is not related to the object like color and other properties. 
14 Husserl recalls the necessity of making the phenomenological reduction in order to 
carry out the analysis of perception in § 7 of Thing and Space (Husserl, 1973: 19-21). 
However, these interferences can be “bracketed” only as long as our main purpose is to 
grasp the object’s invariant form. Our purpose now is quite different. That’s why these 
interferences must be taken into account, all the more so that a lived experience 
corresponds to them. 
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following Thing and Space, we could label it, okulomotorisch, i. e., dependent 
on the movement of the eyes (Husserl, 1973: 226). This means the possibility 
of seeing in a succession (due to the impossibility of doing it simultaneously) 
different albeit congruent parts of the same object. Congruence is, from the 
noematic side, what guarantees the identity. Speaking about external 
perception, Husserl says:  
  
To be sure, the appearing object is there, and that in every phase of the 
perception. But in the transition of phases into ever new and temporally 
separated phases no real moment can be identical, whereas the appearing 
object appears evidently as identically the same throughout all phases and 
appears in differing content. (Husserl, 1968: 172-173) 
 
Does the same hold for shadows along the transition of phases in perception? 
Perhaps prima facie one should say that, since they depend on the perceiving 
subject’s position and on the eventual movement of the light source, shadows 
vary in shape and size, they must be considered inessential to the identity of 
every noematic pole of the perceiving intention. However, so are colors (i.e. 
slightly differences in color don’t hinder the identification process) and similar 
characteristics, although shadows, as we shall soon see, are ontologically 
distinct from them. Husserl, in Thing and Space, stresses the fact that data of 
different fields, for instance, visual and tactile, have no hyletic unity (Husserl, 
1968: 173). And although Husserl does not mention shadows, he could have 
added that different hyletic data from the same visual field, like the colored 
surface of an object and the dark shadow it projects, also have no hyletic unity. 
Merleau-Ponty (1948: 26) has called our attention to a well-known 
painting of Cézanne, Le Portrait de Gustave Geoffroy, that offers an interesting 
solution to the issues connected with the representation of congruence between 
different perspectives. For Merleau-Ponty, it was especially noteworthy the 
way the French painter represented Geoffroy’s work desk15, but this painting 
has other interesting aspects. Cézanne displays the desk as if it was seen from 
 
15 Of course, those objects don’t project their respective shadows over each other. They 
are not able to do it since, as we will stress in a moment, they are represented as seen 
from nowhere. This also entails the fact that the light comes from no specific point in 
Cézanne’s painting. 
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nowhere, or from different perspectives at the same time. We can only take a 
look of a desk from somewhere in space and, depending on our momentary 
“here”, the desk “there” is seen in a certain way. The fact that we say that it is 
always the same desk – i.e. the fact that the several perceptive noemata overlap 
– is a consequence of the fact that “distortions” due to our viewpoint are 
automatically “corrected” and the desk actually seen is every time reconstructed 
in its geometric form16. The overlapping process occurs in time and Cézanne 
was busy in trying to render this temporal process – with its peculiar 
multiplication of perspectives – in one sole image. However, overlapping is just 
a consequence of an intending subject’s movement around the intended 
object17. Cézanne tried to offer a pictorial solution to this problem. That’s the 
second interesting aspect of his painting: how to render the illusion of 
movement? Cézanne offered a solution by the way he depicted the books in the 
shelves behind Geoffroy and on the desk. The fact that, in the shelves, some are 
standing, but some are inclined to the right and others to the left, and on the 
desk they are represented according to different angles of perspective, gives the 
strong impression that someone’s eyes and body are moving around the objects 
depicted. Things would obviously be much complex if a painter intended to 
represent, simultaneously, the movement of the subject, of the objects and of 
the light source, along with the variations of luminosity, brightness and shadow. 
Perhaps only motion pictures can create such an illusion. 
This doesn’t mean that Cézanne thought that the never-ending process of 
perception of a physical object could come to an end. The hidden parts of the 
 
16 Not the “ideal” geometric form of the mathematician, but instead the more or less 
exact form of our lifeworld experience. That is a point Husserl strongly emphasizes in 
Ideas II. Our pre-scientific perceptual encounter is not an interaction with ideal 
theoretical objects, but with books, tables, houses, friends, and the like (Husserl, 1952: 
25). 
17 Most of the times, philosophical analysis of perception is carried out as if the 
perceiving subject was immobile (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008: 99-100). But he is never 
immobile and even a static object is seen from the perspective of a possible movement 
of the perceiver, that would bring it closer or further away from him. In painting, the 
cubist painter Georges Braque was perhaps the one that approached most this 
phenomenological notion, with his idea of a tactile space. He was also concerned with 
the unfolding in the same single painting of all possible perspectives of the same object 
(Golding, 1983: 57). 
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desk, in case we were beyond a real thing, would need further intuitions to be 
grasped. However, Cézanne was trying to represent a lived experience, where 
things come to existence for an intending subject, and the geometrical 
impossibility (according to the laws of projection) of his painted desk only 
intended to show that lifeworld phenomenal experience is different from the 
achievements of science. 
  
 
3. Some ontological problems 
 
In what comes to ontological decisions, shadows bring huge problems. 
Descartes, as is well known, allowed for the existence of three different kinds 
of things: substances, attributes and modes. In the phenomenological jargon, 
we can say that to each of them corresponds a specific mode or appearance. 
According to Descartes, only substances had real independence, even in the 
cases where that independence was only a numerical one, like, for instance, two 
spheres of the same material and size; the existence of attributes was entirely 
dependent on the things of which they were the attributes; modes had an even 
more dependent existence: for instance, movement was dependent of the 
attribute matter (only material bodies have movement), which in its turn was 
dependent on the existence of extended substance. As long as the notion of 
extended substance can be applied to light-waves, perhaps light can be seen as 
a part of extended substance. But shadows have a completely different kind of 
being. 
Now, let us take a look to the 
three images on Figure 2. We see 
three different shadows that have a 
distinct contour; they are projections 
of the forms of a cylinder, a cone, and 
a sphere. With the help of a pencil we 
can trace the limits of each of the 
shadows. If we imagine the light 
source turning around these three 
objects, we can also imagine the shadows turning around them and, after a 360º 
turn, the three shadows occupying the inside of the area we previously 
Figure 2 
Shadows: a Phenomenological Analysis  33 
 
delimited with our pencil. However, if, when the shadow is at the opposite side 
from the one it occupied at the beginning of our experiment (remember we are 
imagining the light source turning around these three geometric solids), we fill 
the contour of the shadow with our pencil, and give it the same gray tonality of 
the shadow, what shall we conclude? Are these two appearances (the shadow 
and the gray area) equivalent? The answer seems to be “no”, for a very simple 
reason: the colored grey area is an appearance, but the shadow is the way the 
geometric solids appears under certain circumstances. 
Following this experiment, we seem prima facie to be legitimized to 
infer that shadows like all other “abnormalities” disappear altogether in the 
process of constitution of the identity of an object when we carry out the method 
of variations. However, things are not so simple. We cannot think of the essence 
of an eclipse without thinking, among other things, of the shadow of the Earth 
on the Moon’s surface18. Shadows in this case are constitutive of the intended 
objectivity, i.e. they belong to their meaning, they cannot be put aside by the 
process of variations as if they were unessential to the phenomenon under 
consideration. Of course, for someone looking at the positions of the Sun, the 
Earth and the Moon from, say, out of the Solar System, there would be no 
eclipse. However, he or she could not grasp the meaning of “eclipse” without 
understanding that the interposition of a celestial body between a star and 
another celestial body would be the cause of the astronomical phenomenon 
called by that name. Consequently, shadows are a part of his understanding of 
the phenomenon, even if we picture a situation where he can only have a 
signitive experience of it and will never be able to fulfill his intention19. (Just 
like someone can understand what means a statement like “a black bird is flying 
up”, even if he cannot actually see a black bird or has never seen one20.) 
 
18 From an astronomical point of view, it seems that shadows in the Moon surface, 
during eclipses, have particular characteristics. However, since we are speaking of the 
perception of shadows in the life-world experience, we can put aside the outcomes of 
scientific achievements. Those characteristics, namely speed, can only be detected by 
rigorous measurements with scientific instruments. 
19 On the importance of the distinction between signitive intentions and intuitively 
fulfilled intentions for a phenomenological theory of perception, see Gallagher & 
Zahavi (2008; 90 ff.). 
20 I take this example from Husserl’s Logical Investigations (1984: 550), who is 
discussing a slightly different issue. 
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Nevertheless, the shadow of the Earth is not a property of the Earth, no more 
than it is a property of the Moon21. Perhaps we have gained a first definition of 
shadows: they have a relational character in the sense that they are always the 
product of a relation; they are either the outcome of a relation between two or 
more objects or of the relation between an object and its surrounding space, and 
in both cases due to the fact that light comes from a certain point.  
From a logical point of view, we may call the relation between an object 
and its shadow an irreflective relation, i.e. the shadow of an object A is not 
projected over itself; but between two different objects A and B the relation 
between the respective shadows can be a symmetric one: A projects a shadow 
over B and, at the same time, the shadow of B may be projected over A, 
regardless their respective sizes22. Now, we must take notice of the existence of 
a third factor, in this last example, that is absent when, in the logic of relations, 
we talk about symmetry; this factor is the light source. However, since light 
always comes from somewhere, this symmetry will never be perfect, i.e. the 
shape and size of both shadows – even if the objects have the same form and 
size – will not be the same. For the same reasons, the degree of adumbration of 
the color of the respective shadowed surfaces will also vary.   
What I have just said can be explained the following manner: suppose 
the object A is red (R) and a shadow from B adumbrates one of its surfaces (aR) 
during the stream of time t1 → t2; then suppose that B is blue (B) and a shadow 
from A adumbrates one of its faces (aB) during the same stream of time t1 → 
t2; supposing additionally that A and B remain motionless, any motion of the 
light source can have the following effect: during the next stream of time t2 → 
t3 A may adumbrate the color of a surface of B and in turn not be adumbrated 
by B.  
 
21 Actually, the problem is a bit more complex, because we must take into account, at 
the same time, the movement of the earth around the sun and the movement of the 
Moon around the earth. But this is another astronomical issue that I don’t need to take 
into consideration for my present purpose. Anyway, see Sorenson (2006: 347). 
22 In some limit situations, the shadow of A over B can render B invisible, especially if 
B is at a certain distance from the perceiver. One of the remarkable characteristics of 
shadows is the fact that they can render invisible an object even if the space surrounding 
the shadowed space still gets some degree of luminosity. 
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Further, there is the ontological problem of the relation between a whole 
and its parts. Color, for instance, is always an “inseparable” part of a whole, 
since I cannot think of an object that does not have at least one color in its 
surface. Things don’t change if I make the experience of a two-colored object, 
for instance, one red and another blue. Nonetheless, I can “abstract” from the 
color or colors and think only on the way an object fulfills space, i.e. on its 
geometrical form and on its material characteristics. The same happens when I 
think of two objects of the same color or of different colors; I can abstract from 
whatever color they have and grasp only their (similar or different) geometrical 
form. In the same way, I can abstract from shadows either taking into account 
the color of each object – that may be adumbrated in some parts of the surface 
by the projection of a shadow – or just taking into account their geometrical 
form. Shadows may render a little more difficult the grasping of the color or 
the form, but I can “abstract” from them altogether, as most of the times I do.  
  
 
4. Final Remarks: shadows, brightness and color 
 
Section VI of Thing and Space addresses some important issues for our analysis 
of shadows. In this final section of his Lecture Husserl replaces his previous 
“static” analysis (from a phoronomical point of view) by “dynamic” analysis. 
This means that the perceived object is now regarded as moving (Husserl, 1973: 
263). The way sensible qualities like color23 and brightness fill in the 
geometrical space is different. Differences in tonality, as the object is moving, 
become relevant for the constitution of the object as an identity pole. Shadows 
get a similar relevance. 
 
23 Husserl speaks sometimes of pre-empirical coloration (Husserl, 1973: 264). Ignoring 
if there is any explanation for the employment of the concept of “pre-empirical”, I 
advance the following one. The coloration of an object is pre-empirical as long as our 
perception of the color (or of the colors, in case it has more than one) reflects not an 
objective chromatic scale but instead the colors as they are seen with their differences 
in brightness. Perhaps we could label them “phenomenological colors”. However, they 
cannot be considered mere subjective phenomena, since they are the outcome of the 
relation of the intending subject with the intended object, under certain circumstances. 
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As I already said, shadows have a particular influence in the perception 
of the color of an object. The concept of adumbration also finds its application 
here. In most of the cases we speak of adumbration when an object shows us 
one of his many profiles (for instance, the front-side and not the backside), but 
adumbrations also play a specific role in the perception of colors. Normally, 
poor light conditions render difficult the perception of the exact color of a 
surface; but also do shadows. In Thing and Space, Husserl described thoroughly 
what happens with the perception of color when an intending subject turns 
around an object (Husserl, 1973: 101). The possible variations in tonality and 
brightness are experienced in a continuous process, so that the subject knows 
that in these cases it’s still the same color of the same object. Since the 
continuous process of variations that follows the primal adumbration of an 
object is Husserl’s main concern, the variations of the lightning condition are 
not very important, provided those identification conditions remain constant.  
That is what one must conclude from the following statements: 
  
I don’t see clearly the corporeal form of my matchbox in the dark corner 
between my books, and the same happens with colors. I would also say that 
I would not reckon them if I were too far away, etc. But if I have the box on 
the table, in front of me, in broad daylight, I will be satisfied if I see it from 
all sides, with which these continuously overlapping appearances, as I turn 
and change the place, have the character of the highest consciousness of 
giveness. (Husserl, 1973: 127) 
 
And as he goes on saying, what is really important in these cases is to have 
“good light”. This is not a very harsh condition, and perhaps one can 
characterize it by saying that it is some intermediate state between light at the 
sunrise and after the sundown. Or, in other words, just what above we called 
the “normal” conditions. It is now easier to see what Husserl means by this: we 
may call “normal” any condition that allows the perceiving subject to correct 
the disturbances in the right perception – of color, form, or whatever –  entailed 
by shadows or by distance from the intended object (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008: 
90). So, we must conclude that a difference in the stimuli does not entail a 
correspondent difference in perception. When someone knows, for instance, 
that the color of a certain surface is light blue he won’t see it as a deep blue 
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only because it is darkened by a shadow. I don’t mean, of course, that the 
intending subject always makes a conscious use of his past perceptions of the 
same surface, compares the outcome of his former perception with the outcome 
of the present one and then adds a “correction factor” (the shadow in my present 
example). Obviously, I am not also denying that this may sometimes happen. 
Perhaps only in extreme cases does a shadow make us change one color 
for another, but it’s a very common experience that a shadow may deceive us 
regarding the exact tonality of a certain color in cases we see an object for the 
first time. (It can make us change a light blue for a deep blue.) Shadows must 
however be distinguished from the more common phenomenon of interference, 
that sometimes entails similar effects. For instance, we may come close to the 
sea expecting to see the typical blue coloration of the water in daylight under 
normal solar luminosity; instead, the water looks like a vast gray surface due to 
the presence of clouds. Of course, the normal effect of interference is the 
projection of a shadow, but interference is only a special case of the general 
phenomenon of shadows we are trying to grasp. It’s easy to see what the 
distinctive mark of shadows is: they have to do, in the first place, with the 
spatial relation between three-dimensional objects and the sources of light. 
Perhaps painting is able to render more accurately the experience of the 
relation between shadows and the perception of color than psychology (perhaps 
with the sole exception of Gestalt psychology) and non-phenomenologically 
oriented philosophies. The latter are most of the times busily showing the 
deficient character of visual perceptions made under the projection of shadows 
above the perceived objects, while at the same time explaining how the 
perceiver “automatically” corrects his first impression and reestablishes the 
“true” color of the intended object. Abnormalities are not understood as a part 
of the normal experience, but instead as something that must be put aside. The 
danger of this attitude seems clear: we run the risk of speaking not of actual 
perceptions but of theoretical reconstructions of what a certain perception 
should be.  
There is a fundamental difference between perceiving shadows and 
perceiving brightness and color, which has to do with the relation between these 
properties and the other properties of an object. That’s why it would be wrong, 
in my opinion, to oppose the experience of light, shadow and brightness, on the 
one hand, and the experience of other non-visual properties, namely, tactile 
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qualities, on the other. I briefly addressed this issue at the beginning of this 
paper, when I mentioned the strange fact that the shadow of a sphere cannot tell 
us whether it is turning around its own axe or not, whereas we can almost 
infallibly acknowledge its movement by direct vision. Of course, then I was 
only thinking of the projection of the shadow of a sphere over a surface or over 
a screen. However, the shading of the surface of a sphere may have a certain 
importance in the perceptual experience, not only of its movement but also of 
its three-dimensionality (Mattens, 2008: 120)24. The situation is different with 
color and brightness since they enable us to guess the smoothness of a thing 
and very often the tactile experience only corroborates what we had already 
guessed. With shadows this is almost impossible, except perhaps in the case of 
the shadow seen from near of a very irregular surface. Regardless these 
differences, shadows must be considered no less indispensable than color and 
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